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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to apply game-theoretic methods to
the classical problem of an optimal portfolio construction. We present a
method for constructing a log-optimal portfolio using the well-calibrated
forecasts of return vectors. Dawid’s notion of calibration and the Black-
well approachability theorem are used for computing the well-calibrated
forecasts. We select a portfolio using this “artificial” probability distribu-
tion of return vectors. Our portfolio performs asymptotically at least as
well as any stationary portfolio that redistributes the investment at each
round using a continuous function of side information. Unlike in classical
mathematical finance theory, no stochastic assumptions are made about
return vectors.
1 Introduction
The model of stock market considered in this paper is the one studied, among
others, by Breiman [5], Algoet and Cover [2], and Cover [8]; see also Gyo¨rpfy et
al. [15].
Consider an investor who can access k financial instruments (asset, bond,
cash, return of a game, etc.), and who can rebalance his wealth in each round
according to a portfolio vector b = (b(1), . . . , b(k)). The evolution of the market
in time is represented by a sequence of return vectors (market values) x1,x2, . . ..
A return vector x = (x(1), . . . , x(k)) is a vector of k nonnegative numbers rep-
resenting price relatives for a given trading period. That is, the jth compo-
nent x(j) of x expresses the ratio of the closing and opening prices of asset
j. In other words, x(j) is the factor by which capital invested in the jth asset
grows during the trading period. We suppose that these components are bounded
x(j) ∈ [λ1, λ2] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, where 0 < λ1 < λ2 <∞.
We assume that the assets are arbitrarily divisible, and they are available
for buying or for selling in unbounded quantities at the current price at any
given trading period; there are no transaction costs, The investor is allowed
to diversify his capital at the beginning of each trading period according to a
portfolio vector b = (b(1), . . . , b(k)). The jth component b(j) of the vector b
denotes the proportion of the investors capital invested in asset j. We assume
that b(j) ≥ 0 for all j and
k∑
j=1
b(j) = 1. This means that the investment strategy
is self-financing and consumption of capital is excluded. The nonnegativity of
the components of b means that short selling and buying stocks on margin are
not permitted. Let Γ denotes the simplex of portfolio vectors b.
Let S0 denote investor’s initial capital. Then, at the end of the first trading
period, investor’s wealth becomes
S1 = S0(b · x) = S0
k∑
j=1
b(j)x(j),
where ” · ” denotes the inner product.
Starting with an initial wealth S0, after T trading periods, an “investment
strategy” b1, . . . ,bT achieves a wealth
ST = S0
T∏
t=1
(bt · xt).
For simplicity, in what follows we assume that S0 = 1.
In modeling the behavior of the evolution of the market, two main approaches
have been considered in the theory of sequential investment. In the probabilistic
approach, we assume that return vectors xt are realization of a sequence of
random process Xt, where t = 1, 2, . . ., and describe a statistical model.
If a market process Xt is memoryless, i.e., it is a sequence of independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random return vectors then it was shown by
Morvai [19] that the portfolio1 b∗ = argmaxbE(log(b · X1)) is asymptotically
optimal in the following sense: for any portfolio vector b with finite 2 E((log(b ·
X1))
2), a condition of optimality lim inf
T→∞
1
T log
S∗T
ST
≥ 0 holds almost surely, where
S∗T =
∏T
t=1(b
∗ ·Xt) and ST =
∏T
t=1(b ·Xt).
But i.i.d. model is insufficient if the return vectors of different trading periods
have a statistical dependence, which seems to be the case in real-world markets.
In general case, we consider an arbitrary random process X1,X2, . . . generating
return vectors x1,x2, . . ..
Algoet [1] and Cover [2] have constructed so-called log-optimum portfolio
strategy. Let X1,X2, . . . be an arbitrary stationary and ergodic process. Denote
Xt−11 = X1, . . . ,Xt−1. A function b
∗(·) is said to be a log-optimal portfolio
strategy if
E(log(b∗(Xt−11 ) ·Xt)) = max
b(·)
E(log(b(Xt−11 ) ·Xt)) (1)
for all t.
Let S∗T denote a wealth achieved by a log-optimum portfolio strategy b
∗(·)
after T trading periods. Then for any stationary and ergodic process Xt and for
any other investment strategy b(·),
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
log
S∗T
ST
≥ 0 (2)
1 In what follows log denotes logarithm on the base 2
2 That is true when Xi are uniformly bounded.
almost surely. Such a strategy is also called universal with respect to the process
X1,X2, . . ..
Moreover, Algoet [1] and Gyo¨rpfy and Scha¨fer [14] have shown that there
exists a strategy uniformly universal with respect to the class of all stationary
and ergodic processes. This means that a strategy b∗(·) exists such that for
any stationary and ergodic process X1,X2, . . . asymptotic inequality (2) holds
almost surely. Gyo¨rfi and Scha¨fer called this scheme a histogram-based invest-
ment strategy. Gyo¨rpfy [15] extended this result to the kernel-based case. The
rate of convergence has not been studied in these papers.
Another, “worst-case”, approach allows a return sequence x1,x2, . . . to take
completely arbitrary values, and no stochastic model is imposed on the mecha-
nism generating the price relatives. This approach was pioneered by Cover [8].
Cover has shown that there exists an investment strategy b∗t (so-called universal
portfolio) that perform almost as well as the best portfolio in the sense that
for any return sequence x1,x2, . . ., S
∗
T ≥ cT−
k−1
2 ST (b) for all T , where c is a
positive constant (depending on k), S∗T =
∏T
t=1(b
∗
t · xt) is the wealth achieved
by of the universal portfolio strategy, and ST (b) =
∏T
t=1(b · xt) is the wealth
achieved by arbitrary constant portfolio b. The universal portfolio is defined as
the mixture b∗T =
∫
bPT−1(db), where PT−1(db) = (
∏T−1
t=1 (b · xt)/Z)D1/2(db),
Z =
∫ ∏T−1
t=1 (b · xt)D1/2(db), and D1/2 is the 1/2-Dirichlet distribution on Γ .
Further development of this approach see in Cover and Ordentlich [9], Vovk
and Watkins [20], Blum and Kalai [4], and so on. In this approach the achieved
wealth is compared with that of the best in a class of reference strategies. The
class of reference strategies considered by Cover [8] is that the class of all constant
portfolios defined by all vectors b ∈ Γ . Cover and Ordentlich [9] extended this
method for a case where side information in form of states from a finite set can
be used by a reference strategy.
The advantage of this worst-case approach is that it avoids imposing statis-
tical models on the stock market and the results hold for all possible sequences
x1,x2, . . .. In this sense this approach is extremely robust.
In Section 2, we follow the combined worst-case and stochastic approach. We
construct an “artificial probability distribution” of return vectors. This distri-
bution is defined by the well-calibrated forecasts in Dawid [10], [11] sense; these
forecasts are constructed using the game-theoretic Blackwell approachability the-
orem. No stochastic assumptions are made about return vectors for constructing
such forecasts. We construct a log-optimal portfolio by scheme (1), where the
mathematical expectation E is over the probability distribution defined by the
well-calibrated forecasts. Our log-optimal portfolio performs asymptotically at
least as well as any stationary portfolio that redistribute the investment at each
round using a continuous function of a side information. In Section 3 we discuss
a rate of convergence of performance condition.
This approach is not new in the game theory. For example, Foster and
Vohra [12], [13] have presented a “calibrated” forecasting scheme which is consis-
tent in hindsight. It allows the agent to choose the best response to the predicted
outcome. See also, Mannor and Shimkin [17].
The goal of this paper is to apply these game-theoretic methods to the clas-
sical problem of an optimal portfolio construction in order to obtain a futher
generalization of results presented in the papers [14], [15]. Unlike most previous
work we use a more broad reference class of investor strategies – we compare
the performance of our portfolio strategy with stationary investor”s strategies
defined by continuous functions bt = b(zt) for all t, where zt is a side informa-
tion.
In Section 4 we show that if b(zt) is allowed to be discontinuous, we cannot
prove asymptotic optimality of our portfolio strategy b∗t .
2 Main result
Blackwell approachability theorem. We will define our randomized strategy
for universal portfolio selection using the Blackwell approachability theorem.
Recall some standard notions of the theory of games. Consider a game be-
tween two players with finite sets of their moves (pure strategies) I = {s1, . . . , sN}
and J = {a1, . . . , aM}. A mixed strategy of the first player is a probability distri-
bution on I presented by a vectorP = (p(1), . . . , p(N)), where p(1)+. . . p(N) = 1
and p(i) ≥ 0 for all i. Denote by P (I) a set of all mixed strategies of the first
player. Analogously, let P (J) be the set of all mixed strategies of the second
player.
Consider an infinitely repeatable game, where at each round t the first player
announces a mixed strategy Pt ∈ P (I) and the second player announces a pure
strategy jt ∈ J . After that, the first player pick up it ∈ I distributed by Pt and
receives a payoff f(it, jt).
The players can announce their moves independently or, in the adversarial
setting, where the second player announces an element jt after the first player
announces Pt.
By a randomized online strategy of the first player we mean an infinite se-
quence P1,P2, . . . of his mixed strategies, where each Pt is a conditional (with
respect to past moves i1, j1, . . . , it−1, jt−1) probability distribution on I.
Let a vector-valued payoff function f(si, aj) ∈ Rd be given, where d ≥ 1,
si ∈ I, and aj ∈ J . As usual, f(P, aj) =
N∑
i=1
f(si, aj)p(i) and f(P,Q) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
f(si, aj)p(i)q(j), where P = (p(1), . . . , p(N)) and Q = (q(1), . . . , q(M))
are elements of P (I) and P (J) respectively.
Note that the Blackwell theorem (see Theorem 1 below) holds for l2 norm in
Rd. In some special case we also consider l1 norm ‖ · ‖1. In all other cases we
use l2 norm ‖ · ‖. The choice of the norm, l1, l2 or l∞, is irrelevant at this stage,
since all norms are equivalent on finite-dimensional spaces. The difference takes
place in Section 3, where we compute a rate of convergence in Theorem 3.
For any subset U ⊆ Rd and any vector x ∈ Rd, the distance from x to U is
defined dist(x, U) = inf
y∈U
‖x− y‖.
Following Blackwell a set U ⊆ Rd is called approachable if a randomized
online strategy P1,P2, . . . of the first player exists such that
lim
T→∞
dist
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(it, jt), U
)
= 0
holds for P -almost all sequences i1, i2, . . . of the first player moves regardless
of how the second player chooses j1, j2, . . ., where P is an overall probability
distribution generated by P1,P2, . . ..
Blackwell [3] proposed a generalization of the minimax theorem for the case
of the vector-payoff functions. In particular, he proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1. A closed convex subset U ⊆ Rd is approachable by the first player
if and only if for every mixed strategy Q ∈ P (J) of the second player a mixed
strategy P ∈ P (I) of the first player exists such that f(P,Q) ∈ U .
We apply this theorem for the log-optimal portfolio selection.
Optimal portfolio construction. We consider the market process in the
game-theoretic framework as a game between two players: Market and Investor.
In deterministic adversarial setting, the market process is described as fol-
lows. At the beginning of each time period t, Investor, observing all past moves
and a side information zt which is an element of some compact metric space C,
chooses a portfolio vector bt. At the end of this period Market, observing all
past moves, chooses a return vector xt. After that, Investor updates his wealth
St = St−1 · (bt · xt). For simplicity, we assume that C is some closed interval in
R.
A strategy of Investor is called stationary if it is defined by a function from
the set of all signals to the simplex of all portfolios: bt = b(zt) for all t.
We discretize all basic sets used in the game. For anyK, let C˜ = {c1, . . . , cK}
be a finite grid in C. For every z ∈ C an cj ∈ C˜ exists such that ‖z− cj‖ < ν,
where ν is a level of precision depending on K.
Recall that for any return vector x = (x(1), . . . , x(k)), x(i) ∈ [λ1, λ2], where
λ1 and λ2 are real numbers such that 0 < λ1 < λ2.
For any M , define a finite grid A˜ = {a1, . . . , aM} in the set [λ1, λ2]k of all
return vectors such that for any return vector a ∈ [λ1, λ2]k an element ai ∈ A˜
exists satisfying ‖a− ai‖ < µ, where M = (1/µ)k. 3
For any vector a ∈ A˜, let δ[a] = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) be the probability distri-
bution concentrated on element a of the set A˜. In this vector of dimension M ,
the ith coordinate is 1, all other coordinates are 0.
Consider a set P (A˜|C˜) of all probability distributions on A˜ conditional with
respect to elements of the set C˜. Any such distribution is defined by the KM -
dimensional vector p = (p(ai|cj) : 1 ≤ i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤ K)′, where
M∑
i=1
p(ai|cj) =
1 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ K, i.e., given cj ∈ C˜, p(·|cj) = (p(ai|cj : 1 ≤ i ≤ M)′ is an
M -dimensional probability vector.4
3 In what follows we ignore the problem of rounding.
4 x′ is the transposition of a vector x.
Let P˜ (A˜|C˜) = {s1, . . . , sN) be an ǫ-grid in the set P (A˜|C˜). For any P ∈
P (A˜|C˜) an si ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜) exists such that ‖P− si‖1 < ǫ.
Now we apply Theorem 1. Consider a two-players infinitely repeated game,
where the first player moves are elements of the N -element set I = P˜ (A˜|C˜) and
the second player moves are from the KM -element set J = A˜× C˜. At any round
t the first player outputs a forecast pt ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜) and the second player outputs
an outcome (xt, zt) ∈ J .
Let si be the ith vector of the set P˜ (A˜|C˜), cj be the jth element of the set
C˜, and a ∈ A˜, 0KM be the KM -dimensional zero vector. The values of payoff
function f are vectors of dimension KMN :
f(si, (a, cj)) =


0NM
. . .
0NM
gj(si, (a, cj))
0NM
. . .
0NM


,
where gj(si, a) is its jth NM -dimensional column-vector defined as a combina-
tion of N column-vectors of dimension M :
gj(si, (a, cj)) =


0M
. . .
0M
δ[a]− si(·|cj)
0M
. . .
0M


,
where δ[a]−si(·|cj) is the difference of twoM -dimensional column-vectors, which
is the ith component of the composite vector gj(si, (a, cj)).
We now define the convex set U = {x ∈ RKNM : ‖x‖1 ≤ ǫ} in the space
RKNM .
By definition, a randomized strategy of the first player is a sequenceP1,P2, . . .,
where each Pt is a conditional (with respect to past moves of both players) prob-
ability distribution on I = P˜ (A˜|C˜).
A set U is approachable if a randomized strategy P1,P2, . . . of the first
player exists such that lim
t→∞
dist(f(pt, (xt, zt)), U) = 0 almost surely regardless
of the second player moves (x1, z1), (x2, z2), . . ., where the trajectory p1,p2, . . . is
distributed according to the overall probability distribution P and pt ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜)
for all t.
By Theorem 1 the closed convex set U is approachable if and only if for each
Q ∈ P(A˜× C˜) an P ∈ P(P˜ (A˜|C˜)) exists such that f(P,Q) ∈ U .
Let Q′(cj) =
∑M
i=1 Q(ai, cj) be the marginal probability distribution on C˜
and Q′′(ai|cj) = Q(ai, cj)/Q′(cj) be the conditional probability, where 1 ≤ j ≤
K.
Let sk ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜) be such that ‖sk−Q′′‖1 < ǫ andP = δ[sk] be the probability
distribution on P˜ (A˜|C˜) concentrated on sk. Then by definition
f(P,Q) = (g1(P,Q), . . . ,gj(P,Q), . . . ,gK(P,Q))
′,
where
gj(P,Q) =


0M
. . .
0M
Q(a1, cj)− sk(a1|cj)
∑M
i=1Q(ai, cj)
. . .
Q(ai, cj)− sk(ai|cj)
∑M
i=1Q(ai, cj)
. . .
Q(aM , cj)− sk(aM |cj)
∑M
i=1Q(ai, cj)
0M
. . .
0M


=
=
= Q′(cj)


0M
. . .
0M
Q′′(a1|cj)− sk(a1|cj)
. . .
Q′′(ai|cj)− sk(ai|cj)
. . .
Q′′(aM |cj)− sk(aM |cj)
0M
. . .
0M


for 1 ≤ j ≤ K. From this ‖f(P,Q)‖1 =
∑K
j=1 Q
′(cj)‖sk(·|cj) −Q′′(·|cj)‖1 < ǫ
follows and then f(P,Q) ∈ U .
By a randomized online strategy of Investor (first player) we mean a se-
quence of conditional probability distributions Pt = Pt(s|σt, zt), t = 1, 2, . . ., on
P˜ (A˜|C˜), where s ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜), σt = (z1,p1,x1, . . . , zt−1,pt−1,xt−1) is a history,
and zt ∈ C˜.
By Theorem 1 a randomized strategy P1,P2, . . . of the first player exists,
such that regardless of that sequence (x1, z1), (x2, z2), . . . was announced by the
second player the sequence of the vector-valued payoffs
m¯t =
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(pt, (xt, zt)) =


1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pt=s1,zt=c1}(δ[xt]− s1(·|c1))
. . .
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pt=sN ,zt=c1}(δ[xt]− sN(·|c1))
. . .
. . .
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pt=s1,zt=cK}(δ[xt]− s1(·|cK))
. . .
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{pt=sN ,zt=cK}(δ[xt]− sN (·|cK))


.
P -almost surely approaches the set U , where P is an overall probability distri-
bution generated by a the sequence P1,P2, . . . of conditional distributions and
the trajectory p1,p2, . . . is distributed by the measure P ; by I{pt=s1,zt=cj} we
denote the indicator function.
Let p1,p2, . . . be a sequence of the well-calibrated forecasts distributed ac-
cording to P1,P2, . . .. Denote
NT (s, i, j) = |{t : pt = s, 1 ≤ t ≤ T,xt = ai, zt = cj}|
and
MT (s, j) = |{t : pt = s, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, zt = cj}|,
where 1 ≤ i ≤M , 1 ≤ j ≤ K, and s be an arbitrary element of the grid P˜ (A˜|C˜).
Approachability of the set U implies the following theorem which is an im-
mediate corollary of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. There exists a randomized online strategy P1,P2, . . . such that for
any sequence z1,x1, . . . , zt,xt, . . .
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
∑
1≤i≤M
|NT (s, i, j)−MT (s, j)s(i|cj)| ≤ ǫ (3)
for almost all sequences p1,p2, . . . distributed according to the overall proba-
bility distribution generated by P1,P2, . . ., where s is an arbitrary element of
P˜ (A˜|C˜) = {s1, . . . , sM}.
We call forecasts p1,p2, . . . satisfying (3) ǫ-calibrated. If (3) holds for each ǫ > 0
then these forecasts are called well-calibrated.
A difference with Foster–Vohra [13] calibration is that each pt is a condi-
tional probability distribution and that this is calibration with respect to a side
information.
Let cj ∈ C˜ and X be a random variable distributed according to the prob-
ability distribution s(·|cj) = (s(1|cj), . . . , s(M |cj)), where P{X = ai} = s(i|cj)
for every 1 ≤ i ≤M . For any probability distribution s ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜) = {s1, . . . , sN}
and any cj ∈ C˜ define the optimal portfolio
b∗(s|cj) = argmaxbEX∼s(·|cj)(log(b ·X)). (4)
We can rewrite (4) also as b∗(s|cj) = argmaxb
M∑
i=1
(log(b · ai))s(i|cj).
Let B˜t = {b∗(s1|zt), . . . ,b∗(sN |zt)} be the set of all optimal portfolios, where
zt ∈ C˜ be a side information at round t. Using a randomized forecast pt ∈
P˜ (A˜|C˜) distributed according to Pt existing by the Blackwell approachability
theorem, we can define at any round t of the game presented on Fig 1 the random
portfolio
b∗t = b
∗(pt|zt) = argmaxbEX∼pt(·|zt)(log(b ·X)), (5)
where pt ∈ P˜ (A˜|C˜) is the random forecast announced at round t and zt is the
signal at step t.
The corresponding randomized algorithm is presented on Fig. 1. We consider
two types of investors: Investor uses the randomized algorithm for computing
an optimal portfolio, Stationary Investor uses a continuous function of the side
information.
FOR t = 1, 2 . . .
Market announces a signal zt.
Investor announces a probability distribution Pt = Pt(·|σt, zt) on the set P˜ (A˜|C˜).
Market announces a return vector xt.
Investor pick up a portfolio b∗t ∈ B˜t distributed by Pt considered on B˜t and updates
his wealth S∗t = S
∗
t−1 · (b
∗
t · xt).
Stationary Investor updates his wealth St = St−1 · (b(zt) · xt).
ENDFOR
Fig. 1. Protocol of portfolio game
We have presented the construction using the approximation grids of a fixed
accuracy. The complete construction is divided on time intervals 1 ≤ t1 ≤ . . . <
tn ≤ . . .. At time steps t ∈ [tn, tn+1) the grids C˜n, A˜n of cardinality Kn, Mn
and P˜n(A˜n|C˜n) of cardinality Nn are used, where n = 1, 2, . . .. These grids
approximate the sets C, A, and P (A) with an increasing degree of accuracy:
Mn →∞, Kn →∞ and ǫn → 0, µn → 0 as n→∞.
The following theorem asserts that in this case portfolio (5) is almost surely
log-optimal with respect to the class of all portfolios presented by continuous
functions b(·) : C →R.
Theorem 3. The randomized portfolio strategy b∗t defined by (5) and by refining
the discretization incrementally is almost surely log-optimal for the class of all
continuous portfolio strategies b(·):
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
log
S∗T
ST
≥ 0 (6)
for almost all trajectories p1,p2, . . ., where S
∗
T =
∏T
t=1(b
∗
t · xt) is the wealth
achieved by of the universal portfolio strategy, ST =
∏T
t=1(b(zt) · xt) is the
wealth achieved by an arbitrary portfolio b(zt), and zt is a signal at any round
t.
Proof. The complete proof is based on the construction which is divided on time
intervals 1 ≤ t1 ≤ . . . < tn ≤ . . . and the grids with increasing degree of accuracy
as indicated above. For simplicity of presentation, we give the proof only for one
of such grids. Given ǫ > 0 and µ > 0, we consider the corresponding grids C˜,
A˜, and P˜ (A˜|C˜) and prove optimality of the universal portfolio up to O(µ + ǫ).
Notice that M = (1/µ)k and N = (1/ǫ)KM−1.
Replace the sums with return vectors and signals on their approximations
from the corresponding grids. Let us estimate the loss of accuracy as a result of
such replacements.
Notice that for any b ∈ Γ , x ∈ A and a ∈ A˜ such that ‖x− a‖ < µ we have
|(b·x)−(b·a)| = |(b·(x−a))| ≤ ‖b‖‖x−a‖ ≤ ‖x−a‖ < µ. Then for b·x) ≥ (b·a),
| ln(b · x)− ln(b · a)| =
∣∣∣ln (b·x)(b·a) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ln(1 + (b·x)−(b·a)(b·a) )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ (b·x)−(b·a)(b·a) ∣∣∣ ≤ µ/λ1,
where ln is the natural logarithm; if b · x) < (b · a) we can exchange role of a
and x.
Let b(·) be an arbitrary continuous stationary portfolio strategy. Given ǫ > 0
consider a sufficiently accurate approximating grid C˜ = {c1, . . . , cK} in the set
C of all signals satisfying the following property: for each z ∈ C an ci ∈ C˜ exists
such that5 ‖b(z)− b(ci)‖ < ǫ.
Therefore, all sums are changed on O(µ+ ǫ) as a result of these replacements
of return vectors and signals. Assuming that return vectors xt and signals zt are
now elements of the corresponding finite grids and using continuity of the func-
tion b(·), we obtain the estimate for the mean wealth of an arbitrary portfolio
b(·):
1
T
log ST =
1
T
T∑
t=1
log(b(zt) · xt) =
K∑
j=1
1
T
∑
s∈P˜(A˜|C˜)
M∑
i=1
NT (s, i, j) log(b(cj) · ai) +O(ǫ + µ), (7)
5 Since the complete construction is based on the sequence of ǫk-grids, where ǫk → 0
as k →∞, for each continuous function b(·) an ǫk-grid exists such that this property
holds.
where NT (s, i, j) = |{t : pt = s, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,xt = ai, zt = cj}|. By (3) of
Theorem 2
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
∑
1≤i≤M
|NT (s, i, j)−MT (s, j)s(i|cj)| ≤ ǫ+ o(1)
as T →∞ almost surely.
Starting from (7) we obtain the following chain of equalities and inequalities
which are valid almost surely
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
M∑
i=1
NT (s, i, j) log(b(cj) · ai) =
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
MT (s, j)
M∑
i=1
log(b(cj) · ai)s(i|cj) + O(ǫ) + o(1) =
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜(A˜|C˜)
MT (s, j)EX∼s(·|cj)(log(b(cj) ·X)) + O(ǫ) + o(1) ≤
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜(A˜|C˜)
MT (s, j)EX∼(s(·|cj)(log(b
∗(s|cj) ·X)) + O(ǫ) + o(1) =
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
MT (s, j)
M∑
i=1
log(b∗(s|cj) · ai)s(i|cj) + O(ǫ) + o(1) =
1
T
∑
1≤j≤K
∑
s∈P˜ (A˜|C˜)
1
T
M∑
i=1
NT (s, i, j) log(b
∗(s|cj) · ai) +O(ǫ) + o(1). (8)
as T →∞.
Now, we change from (8) to general setting
K∑
j=1
∑
s∈P˜(A˜|C˜)
1
T
M∑
i=1
NT (s, i, j) log(b
∗(s|cj) · ai) +O(µ+ ǫ) + o(1) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
log(b∗t · xt) +O(µ+ ǫ) + o(1) =
1
T
logS∗T +O(µ + ǫ) + o(1) (9)
almost surely, where S∗T is the wealth achieved by the optimal portfolio.
Relations (7) and (9) imply that almost surely lim inf
T→∞
1
T log
S∗T
ST
≥ −c(ǫ+ µ),
where c is a positive constant. The proof for the case of a fixed approximating
grid is complete.
3 Some remarks on rate of convergence
In this section following Mannor and Stoltz [18] we discuss rate of convergence
in the optimality condition (6). This rate is defined by the rate of convergence of
a calibrated forecaster in the Blackwell approachability theorem (3) and on the
infinite series of grids C˜, A˜, and P˜ (A˜|C˜). We assume that all portfolios functions
b(·) are Lipschitz continuous.
The proof of the approachability theorem gives rise to an implicit strategy, as
indicated in Blackwell [3]. We start from a variant the Blackwell theorem for l2
norm ‖·‖2. Denote dU (x) the projection of x in l2-norm onto U . According to the
proof of this theorem (see Blackwell [3] or Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [7], Section
7), at each round t > 2 and with the notations above, the forecaster should pick
his action pt at random according to a distribution Pt on the set P˜ (A˜|C˜) such
that (m¯t−1 − dU (m¯t−1)) · (f(Pt, (aj , ck)) − m¯t−1) ≤ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M and
1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Proof of the Blackwell theorem from Blackwell [3] and convergence theorem
for Hilbert space-valued martingales of Kallenberg and Sztencel [16] (see also
Chen and White [6]) provide uniform convergence rates of sequence of empirical
payoff vectors m¯t to the target set U : there exists an absolute constant c such
that for any δ > 0 for all strategies of Market and for all T , with probability
1− δ,
‖m¯t − dU (m¯t)‖2 ≤ c
√
log 1δ
T
, (10)
where ‖ · ‖2 is the Euclidian norm in RKNM .6
The set U used in the proof of Theorem 3 is defined using l1-norm. Then,
using triangle inequality and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
‖m¯T ‖1 ≤ ‖dU (m¯T ‖1 + ‖m¯T − dU (m¯T )‖1 ≤ ǫ+
√
KMN‖m¯T − dU (m¯T )‖2,
where N = O((1/ǫ)KM−1). Hence, by (10) we have
‖m¯T ‖1 ≤ cǫ+ c
√
log 1δ
ǫKM−1T
. (11)
The suitable choice of ǫ is when both terms of the sum (11) are of the same order
of magnitude, i.e., ǫ ∼ T− 1KM+1 . This is the optimal level of precision in (8).
Further, we have to find the optimal level of precision in (7). We should
optimize the choice of M = (1/µ)k, where µ is the level of precision of of ap-
proximating the values xt.
Assuming that the signal space C is a closed interval of real numbers, b(·)
is Lipschitz continuous, and getting K = 1/µ, we should choose the suitable µ
to minimize the sum µ + T−
1
KM+1 , where KM = (1/µ)k+1. The optimal value
is µ ∼ (log T )− 1k+2 .
Combining series of grids, like it was done in in Vyugin [21], we can obtain
a rough bound O(log T )−
1
k+2
+ν of the rate of convergence in (6), where ν is an
6 See Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [7], Exersice 7.23. Recall that N = |P˜ (A˜|C˜)|, M = |A˜|,
and K = |C˜|.
arbitrary small positive real number, and k is the number of assets. More precise,
for any δ > 0, with probability 1− δ,
1
T
logS∗T ≥
1
T
logST − c(log(T/ log 1
δ
))−
1
k+2
+ν
for all T , where c is a constant and ST =
∏T
t=1(b(zt) ·xt) is the wealth achieved
by an arbitrary Lipschitz continuous portfolio b(·).
4 Competing with discontinuous stationary strategies
The portfolio strategy b∗t defined in Theorem 3 performs asymptotically at least
as well as any continuous strategy b(zt). A weak point the strategy b(zt) is that
a continuous function cannot respond sufficiently quickly to information about
changes of the return vectors.
A positive argument in favor of the requirement of continuity of b(·) is that it
is natural to compete only with computable trading strategies, and continuity is
often regarded as a necessary condition for computability (Brouwer’s “continuity
principle”).
If b(·) is allowed to be discontinuous, we cannot prove asymptotic optimality
of our portfolio strategy b∗t . We present below the corresponding construction.
Consider a portfolio game with two assets and suppose that an algorithm
exists which when fed with t and a history σt = b
∗
1,x1, . . . ,b
∗
t−1,xt−1 outputs
a probability distribution Pt = Pt(·|σt) on the simplex of all portfolios and let
a portfolio b∗t be distributed by Pt. Denote by et = EPt(b
∗
t ) = (e1,t, e2,t)
′ the
conditional mathematical expectation of b∗t with respect to σt.
Suppose that zt = σt be a signal at round t. Define b(zt) = (b1(zt), b2(zt))
′,
where
b1(zt) =
{
1 if e1,t ≤ 12
0 otherwise
and b2(zt) = 1− b1(zt).
For any t, define a return vector xt = (x1,t, x2,t)
′, where x1,t = 2, x2,t = 1 if
e1,t ≤ 12 and x1,t = 1, x2,t = 2 otherwise.
Let ST =
∏T
t=1(b(zt) · xt) be a wealth achieved by the stationary portfolio
b(·) and S∗T =
∏T
t=1(b
∗
t · xt) be a wealth achieved by the randomized portfolio
strategy b∗t in the first T rounds.
By definition log STS∗
T
=
T∑
t=1
log (b(zt)·xt)(b∗t ·xt)
. It is easy to verify that for any t,
log
(b(zt) · xt)
(b∗t · xt)
=
{
2
1+b∗
1,t
if e1,t ≤ 12
2
1+b∗
2,t
otherwise
Then for any t,
EPt
(
log
(b(zt) · xt)
(b∗t · xt)
)
=


EPt
2
1+b∗
1,t
≥ 12EPt
1−b∗1,t
1+b∗
1,t
≥ 18 if e1,t ≤ 12
EPt
2
1+b∗
2,t
≥ 12EPt
1−b∗2,t
1+b∗
2,t
≥ 18 otherwise
Then EP
(
log STS∗
T
)
≥ 18T for all T , where P is an overall probability distribution
defined by all Pt, t = 1, 2, . . .. By the martingale law of large numbers
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
log
ST
S∗T
≥ 1
8
almost surely. Therefore, the stationary portfolio strategy b(·) outperforms the
portfolio strategy b∗t almost surely.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show how the game-theoretic methods can be applied to the
classical problems of a universal portfolio construction. We present the method
for constructing a log-optimal portfolio in a game-theoretic framework and in
adversarial setting. No stochastic assumptions are made about return vectors.
Instead, we define “an artificial probability distribution” for return vectrs using
the method of calibration. Using this distribution, we construct the log-optimal
portfolio by the standard scheme (1), where the mathematical expectation E
is over probability distribution defined by well-calibrated forecasts. Our log-
optimal portfolio performs asymptotically at least as well as any stationary port-
folio that redistribute the investment at each round using a continuous function
of the side information. This performance is almost surely, where the corre-
sponding probability distribution is an internal distribution of the probabilistic
algorithm computing well-calibrated forecasts on the base of the Blackwell ap-
proachability theorem. Theorem 3 is valid not only for log-loss function but also
for any Lipschitz continuous loss-function.
The drawback of this approach is the very poor rate of convergence in (6),
but it is true for basically all nontrivial applications of approachability (probably
except of V’yugin [21]) because the constructions used to employ it results in
many extra dimensions which do not suit l2 geometry for the problem. Note that
no rate of convergence exists for portfolio strategies universal with respect to the
class of all stationary and ergodic processes.
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